The oil industry knew it was having blow preventer problems.
US Person posted previously that a BP company spokesman briefly addressed the issue at an earnings conference in the second quarter of 2009. He assured his listeners that the problem was well in hand and would not affect future earnings.
{5.03.10}However, an
industry study of BOP problems was made and the results presented to a conference seven years ago. The study was coauthored by the then director of technology development for Transocean, Inc., the owner of the destroyed
Deepwater Horizon offshore platform. Transocean is a major player in the offshore, operating around 140 rigs. The report candidly admits that because of the drilling boom promoted under the Regime, R&D related to safety equipment was either lagging behind or being developed contemporaneously with demand for improved equipment. Previously, equipment such as blowout preventers had not been operating in depths over a mile down where water pressures reach 2500 psi. So there was a lack of already proven systems for use in deepwater operations. The paper was intended to show that specific engineering performance specifications could be developed before the deployment of untested equipment was made. The authors pointed out, "The process described in this paper is contrary to how the offshore industry typically specifies its equipment. Historically, functionality has been the primary focus of bid specifications." For offshore operations in deep water one of the most expensive downtime events is having to pull the riser and subsurface BOP because of a malfunction. A typical "roundtrip" could cost a drilling contractor $1 million per event. According to the report, BOP failure was most often associated with hydraulic components in an electrical-hydralic system use to close rams that cut through the well's lining and seal it. The authors said such failures were "common" and cost all offshore drilling contractors substantial revenue. The goal of their project was to develope a subsea BOP that could operate for five years without the need to pull the system to the surface for unplanned maintenance.
BP's stumbling approach to capping the wild well on Mississippi Canyon block 252 demonstrates vividly the industry's
profit first approach to operations. The company did not have a pre-planned
ecological disaster response for the event determined by the company to "high unlikely" in its planning documents submitted to the government agency responsible for
mismanaging the OCS. The cofferdam lowered over the wellhead 5,000 feet below the surface is
not working.The extreme water pressures are causing gas hydrate crystals to form inside the steel box making it buoyant. Without a tight seal to the sea floor, the gushing crude-seawater mix cannot be pumped to the surface. Because the cofferdam technique has not been used at depths of one mile or more, BP was unable to anticipate the physical reaction preventing a seal. While the nation waits for a solution, the Gulf becomes even more contaminated at the rate of 210,000 gallons a day.
[graphic: Orlando Sentinel]
