- Deciding to use six spacers to hold the drill pipe in the center of the well bore rather than the 21 Halliburton recommended.
- Not waiting for the results of stability tests on a cement mixture before pouring it into the well.
- Not running a specialized test to be sure the cement was secure once it had been poured despite having a capable subcontractor on board the rig.
- Avoiding expensive disposal requirements by using unusual materials in the final steps of sealing the well instead of those required by industry standards.
- Removing heavy drilling mud from the drill pipe before a key plug had been set thus allowing natural gas an avenue of escape.
- Setting a surface cement plug deeper that regulations called for.
- Not installing other physical barriers that would have blocked the oil flow, such as an additional set of ram sheers.
- Not recognizing the need for further tests to resolve conflicting testing information.
Thursday, January 06, 2011
Commission Report Identifies Key BP Errors
The presidential commission investigating the Deepwater Horizon disaster released findings to the public Thursday that confirms the conclusion posted previously {"Deepwater Horizon"} that not merely negligence was responsible for the disaster, but intentional cost saving decisions that caused the United State's largest oil spill. British Petroleum had never drilled in the Mississippi Canyon before, and the Macondo well proved a difficult one due to fragile rock formations that cracked easily under too much pressure. The strata's fragility also required a lighter cement mixture than ordinary be used to seal the well. The errors cited in the report are: