Sunday, June 03, 2007

Why We Cannot Win in Iraq

Another prominent British military officer, General Sir Michael Rose, former commander of U.N. peacekeeping forces in Bosnia and SAS officer made a recent public comment that there is no way coalition forces can win the war, and that forces should withdraw from Iraq. This is a view reaching consensus outside of official Washington because there is a belated realization among professional military men that military forces were deployed to Iraq without an achievable political goal. Military planners in the UK are preparing a one year withdrawal schedule to present to new Prime Minister Gordon Brown.

The stated goals for the invasion have varied over time. "Regime change" toppled a secular dictator creating a power vacuum that has not been filled by an effective democratic government. Establishing a liberal, western style democracy in Iraq by free election was one of the stated reasons for the invasion. Such an outcome was highly unlikely given the historical pattern in the Middle East. Islamist parties won in Algeria in the 1990's and in Palestine in the 2000s. In place in Iraq is a popular theocracy whose limited national power is underwritten by Shia militia. Their goal is to oust the foreign occupation and eliminate from power their former oppressors, the Sunnis. Their goal is not national reconciliation. Despite U.S. requests, the Maliki government can do little to control them. By eliminating the Baathist regime, the U.S. guaranteed the rise of radical Islamic forces. The only functioning government within Iraq's boundaries is that of Kurdistan which has accomplished a de facto secession. The possibility of a fully independent Kurdistan is alarming Turkey because it has a large and restive Kurdish minority living in its eastern border region. The situation in northern Iraq is so tense that Secretary of Defense Gates felt it necessary to warn Turkey not to attack Kurdish forces. Making Iraq a front in the 'global war on terror' has been counterproductive. Saddam ruthlessly suppressed radical elements in Iraq and refused to entertain overtures by the master terrorist, Bin Laden. Iraq post Saddam is one of the main recruitment and training sites for terrorists, and they use the foreign occupation as an effective propaganda tool. Critics, including myself, think the invasion was largely driven by strategic geopolitical considerations. But controlling Iraq's significant oil reserves has not been accomplished due to the anarchy that reins in Iraq's southern oil region and the corrupt, disorganized reconstruction program. The central government still cannot reach agreement on the method of sharing oil revenue between it's three major factions.

To stay in Iraq for as long as the U.S. has maintained forces in South Korea is not a viable political or military solution. There is no guarantee that Iraq would not dissolve even with significant U.S. forces occupying their "Lilly pads" or the fortified permanent bases currently being built. American military analysts think that the U.S. military is suffering a slow melt down similar to what was experienced during the defeat in Vietnam. The pace of redeployments to the war zone is consuming men and material at a rapid rate. It may take many years for the Army and Marine Corps to recover their readiness ratings. British military thinker and former NATO deputy commander in the successful Kosovo campaign, General Sir Rupert Smith, says the true aim of military force in counterinsurgencies is to influence the intentions of the people. Thus, the battle for hearts and minds is not a complementary activity to the use of force, it is the main purpose of modern warfare. This is an inversion of what was war where the objective was to break the enemy's will to fight. In his view the use of force in Iraq is pointless, insofar as it never had achievable political goals.

This is not to say there are no effective counterinsurgency strategies. There are a few success stories. Over a period of thirty years, British governments conducted a two prong strategy against Irish terrorists. British officials treated the acts of terror, including an attempt to decapitate the government at Brighton in 1981, as criminal acts, not acts of war to be dealt with exclusively by the army. While protecting the government of Northern Ireland, Britain began a political process intended to engage sectarian factions so that a cease fire and power sharing arrangement could eventually be reached. Such a political process is impossible in Iraq now that regime change has effectively dismantled the state. Its equally clear that America's current position in the middle of a sectarian civil war is untenable. The recent increase in troop strength is not quelling violence but underlining the reality of failure. The U.S. succeeded in suppressing the Philippine Insurrection at the beginning of the last century. Famine, disease and a poorly equipped enemy aided our harsh efforts. The 'Injun Fighting' used then would be morally unacceptable and constitute war crimes now.

There is no easy exit from Iraq. Its not like Vietnam in this respect. There was an effective government in the north waiting to take over the south and unify the country after the Americans departed. Vietnam had a largely agrarian economy of small global significance. Iraq has no unifying government, and its oil resources are critical to global commerce. When Americans leave Iraq there will be a struggle for control of resources that may draw in proxy forces from Syria, Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia. Whatever the outcome of that struggle is, we will have to accept it as part of our own doing.