US Person delayed this post out of respect for the survivors of Operation Overlord, the landings on Normandy beaches, June 6, 1944. He has read many accounts of the bloody battle on Omaha beach, some of which are based on primary sources. The real story of the massacred first wave has been lost in the myth making since then. Of course retelling of the landings are bound to be affected by the desire to do honor to those men who swam and crawled ashore beneath a hail of bullets and exploding ordinance. The movie,
Saving Private Ryan, makes a praiseworthy attempt a verisimilitude, but it might beyond film making to depict the horror and slaughter that turn the tide red.
The brass knew Omaha would be a difficult challenge due to the terrain and fortifications. A wide beach was dominated by high bluffs peppered with gun emplacements and machine gun nests that enfiladed the wide open killing zone. Beach obstacles, mines, sandbars, currents, and an extreme tide made a close approach by boats problematic. An infantry assault alone would be extremely difficult if not impossible to overcoming the German's careful preparation. Only extensive deception efforts by the allies, incomplete constructions, and obsessive preconception by Herr Hitler with Calais prevented more troops and panzers being available to throw the landing force back into the sea. At 06:30 the amphibious assault against the "impenetrable Atlantic wall" began.
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| F4U Corsairs provide Marines support |
The question of why there were so many casualties on Omaha (~2000) boils down to allied tactics. Aerial bombardment and naval gunfire failed to destroy most of the gun emplacements and infantry bunkers. That is not surprising given the strength of the fortifications and the inaccuracy of aerial bombing at the time.
US Person has asked: given complete allied air superiority, why were not the first waves accompanied by close air support that could be called in by pinned-down infantry to destroy enemy strong points with napalm if necessary? This air-ground coordination had already been effectively used in the South Pacific. He is unable to determine if any aircraft carriers capable of providing this close air cover were among the 7,000 ships of the Allied armada under British command (about 80% of the ships were British). The United States had some 27 carriers in the Pacific by the war's end; it could have spared two to strike Omaha. Tactical apologists claim bombardment had to be limited because the inland approaches were narrow and few. This claim may hold true for unguided bombing from naval artillery 8 miles offshore, or from aerial bombing from 10,000 ft. An experienced Navy or Marine pilot attacking from a few hundred feet or less and guided by forward observers could have been accurate enough to avoid blocking beach exit points
[photo above].*
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| Marines in "water buffalo" head for Tinian |
Its well known that almost no armor made it ashore in the first hours of the desperate battle. Of thirty Shermans ferried near the beach, 27 did not make it ashore, swamped by seawater. Heavily loaded soldiers were landed in lightly armed, if at all, Higgins boats in chest-high water. In the Pacific, Marines were landing in armored, tracked amphibious vehicles
[photo], some of which were equipped with howitzers, and capable of crossing coral reefs. Once ashore on dry land these armored vehicles provided temporary cover and fire support for infantrymen moving inland. No such cover existed on Omaha. Survivors of the first wave resorted to using the tide as their only cover, drifting in to land as it rose. At least the first wave on Omaha should have been carried farther up the beach by
armored amtracks (LVTs) followed by more reinforcements in landing craft. Read this eyewitness account of the first landing by
Able Co, 116th of the sacrificial 29th Infantry Division (~200 men):
Able Company riding the tide in seven Higgins boats is still five
thousand yards from the beach when first taken under artillery fire. The
shells fall short. At one thousand yards, Boat No. 5 is hit dead on and
foundered. Six men drown before help arrives. Second Lieutenant Edward
Gearing and twenty others paddle around until picked up by naval craft,
thereby missing the fight at the shore line. It's their lucky day. The
other six boats ride unscathed to within one hundred yards of the shore,
where a shell into Boat No. 3 kills two men. Another dozen drown,
taking [sic] to the water as the boat sinks. That leaves five boats. Lieutenant Edward Tidrick in Boat No. 2 cries out: "My God, we're coming in at the right spot, but look at it! No shingle, no wall, no shell holes, no cover. Nothing!"
His men are at the sides of the boat, straining for a view of the
target. They stare but say nothing. At exactly 6:36 A.M. ramps are
dropped along the boat line and the men jump off in water anywhere from
waist deep to higher than a man's head. This is the signal awaited by
the Germans atop the bluff. Already pounded by mortars, the floundering
line is instantly swept by crossing machine-gun fires from both ends of
the beach.
Able Company has planned to wade ashore in three files from each
boat, center file going first, then flank files peeling off to right and
left. The first men out try to do it but are ripped apart before they
can make five yards. Even the lightly wounded die by drowning, doomed by
the water logging of their overloaded packs. From Boat No. 1, all hands
jump off in water over their heads. Most of them are carried down. Ten
or so survivors get around the boat and clutch at its sides in an
attempt to stay afloat. The same thing happens to the section in Boat
No. 4. Half of its people are lost to the fire or tide before anyone
gets ashore. All order has vanished from Able Company before it has
fired a shot.
Within seven minutes after the ramps drop, Able Company is inert and leaderless. By the end of fifteen minutes, Able Company has still not
fired a weapon. No orders are being given by anyone. No words are
spoken. The few able-bodied survivors move or not as they see fit.
Merely to stay alive is a full-time job. The fight has become a rescue
operation...
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| USS Emmons left, USS Doyle background |
If it were not for naval destroyers ordered to close the beach at around 0830hrs, risking grounding to provide close fire support (~800 yards) for subsequent assault waves, the landing might have failed. In fact the situation was so doubtful that commanding General Omar Bradley considered landing additional troops elsewhere. Eventually, infantrymen exhibiting extreme courage and initiative made it to the foot of the cliffs and fought their way to the top through the heavily defended gullies. Navy gunners, aided by the top secret Bigot maps,
knocked out eight gun emplacements covering Omaha Beach exits. By the afternoon the battle's outcome was determined. The 29th had lost 40% of its effective manpower by the end of "the longest day". The 1st, which landed to the east of the 29th, suffered similar heavy casualties. Their gallant heroism and sacrifice is admired to this day, but US Person asks, was the extreme sacrifice really necessary or was it the result of tactical errors made by the planners of Operation Neptune Rex?
*Army generals were loath to employ the relatively new tactical concept of close air support for fear of fratricide and the de-emphasis on ground warfare. But when Operation Cobra was launched to pierce German lines in Normandy that had stymied the allied advance, General Bradley resorted to intensive air bombardment. The 4,000 ton carpet blasting was effective, killing a third of the German troops and creating chaos, which VII Corps forces then exploited. But the massive aerial assault cost more than 600 American lives too, as some bombs missed their intended targets. Eisenhower was depressed by the losses vowing to Bradley that he would never again allow heavy bombers support ground operations.
