-
Little
or no improvement in the key availability, reliability, and flying-hour
metrics over the last several years means too few F-35s will likely be
ready for combat when they are most needed, now or for the foreseeable
future.
- During durability testing, the Marine and Navy F-35s have suffered so many cracks and received so many repairs and modifications that the test planes can’t complete their 8,000-hour life-expectancy tests. The Marine version’s air frame, which is intended to withstand the stress of VSTOL operations, could be so short that today’s F-35Bs might end up in the boneyard as early as 2026, 44 years before the program’s termination date
-
Despite
years of patches and upgrades, the F-35’s most combat-crucial computer
systems continue to malfunction, including the Autonomic Logistics
Information System (ALIS) maintenance and parts ordering network; and
the data links that display, combine, and exchange target and threat
information among fighters and intelligence sources.
- The program has not provided the resources necessary to build, test, and validate the on board mission-data files that control mission accomplishment and survival.
-
As
in previous years, cyber security testing shows that many previously
confirmed F-35 vulnerabilities have not been fixed, meaning that enemy
hackers could potentially shut down the ALIS network, steal secret data
from the network and on-board computers, and perhaps prevent the F-35
from flying or from accomplishing its missions.
- The all-important and much-delayed F-35 Initial Operational Test and Evaluation report—assessing whether the plane is combat-suitable and ready for full-scale production—may well not only be late, but may also be based on testing that is considerably less combat-realistic than planned. This is both because test personnel are forced to make do with incompletely developed, deficiency-laden planes, and the F-35 program has for years failed to fund adequate test-range hardware and realistic multi-aircraft, multi-threat simulation facilities.
That the weapons emporium is very sensitive about deserved criticism of the F-35's capabilities, is demonstrated by a rigged fly-off in the ground support role against the venerable and combat proven A-10 that took place last summer; this testing was required three years ago by the Senate. However, the way the tests were designed was not a verisimilitude of ground attack conditions against an enemy at least equipped with infantry launched SAMs. As one informed military observer put it, "The test[ing] was designed by someone with a vested financial interest in the F-35 program, rather than by people whose primary interest is its performance in combat." The results of the tests have not been released. It would be extremely embarrassing for the Pentagon if a Vietnam-era aircraft exceeded the performance of a modern fighter costing $154 million each. The A-10 continually demonstrates the superiority of a purpose-built aircraft as opposed to a multi-role 'superfighter' that is master of none.
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| the Death Star is more expensive |