Russia made a tragic miscalculation by invading Ukraine. The Kremlin underestimated the ability of Ukraine's fighting forces, western financial and logistical support, and the abilities of its own military. The Ukrainian War has become Russia's Vietnam in which that nation has lost more men than the USA in Southeast Asia. This is not the first time Russia has faced defeat in the region. It lost the Crimean War in 1856 when Britain, France and their Turkish allies signed the Paris Peace Treaty*. They lost their naval base at Sebastopol, and ceased to dominate the Black Sea. During the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, the Tsar began rebuilding Sebastopol. By WWII the Soviets had regained the peninsula, but Sebastopol was again destroyed by Nazi bombing. Stalin ordered it restored to its former neoclassic glory.
Russia's relationship with Crimea is long and complex, essentially beginning when Catherine the Great annexed (yes, even then) it after defeating the Ottoman Empire at the Battle of Koludzha. The strategic land mass gave Russia military dominance over the Black Sea region, and a gateway to the wider Mediterranean for its naval forces. Then, somewhat inexplicably at the time, the Presidium under Khrushchev assigned Crimea to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic by decree in 1954. Documents later uncovered from Soviet archives show that the transfer was intended as a "noble act of the Russian people" to "commemorate the 300th anniversary" of the unification of Russia and Ukraine in consideration of the territorial proximity of Crimea and the commonality of its culture and economy with Ukraine. The 300th anniversary mentioned was a reference to the Treaty of Pereyaslav, between the Cossack Hermanate and Tsar Alexsei I of Moscovy. The shared culture and economy was largely changed by Stalin's ethnic cleansing policy of forced deportation of 200,000 Tartars to Central Asia, immigration of ethnic Russians into Crimea (chart, above) and the economic aftermath of WWII.
More recent historical research indicates the motivation for giving up "Russian" Crimea (see chart above) was the power struggle between Khrushchev and his party rivals, notably Prime Minister Georgii Malenkov. He was elevated to party First Secretary in 1953, but was still consolidating his power in 1954. He hoped to enlist in his power struggle theUkrainian party leader and Presidium member. Earlier in his career Khrushchev was head of the Ukrainian Communist Party. During his tenure from the late 30's to 1949, he oversaw a fierce civil war in Ukraine's western annexations, Galicia and Volynia. That bitter war was over by 1954.Apparently Khrushchev actually saw the transfer of the Crimea to Ukraine as a way of consolidating Soviet control over the region after winning the civil war, and a means of winning his power struggle with Malenkov whom he eventually unseated in 1955. About 860,000 ethnic Russians would immigrate to the Ukraine to insure a close relationship within the Union. Bringing in the Crimea with its majority Russian population would bolster Soviet control over Ukraine.
The political landscape changed once again when the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991. In August 1991, Ukraine declared its independence from the Soviet Union. The Russian Federation formally accepted Ukraine's borders at the time, which included the Crimea. A treaty signed in 1997 allowed Russia to keep its Black Sea fleet in Sebastopol under a lease agreement extending until 2042. In 2014 Putin forcibly annexed Crimea in violation of its previous agreements with Ukraine. One of the justifications offered was the majority status of Russian residents. Another huge influx of about 247,000 ethnic Russians, mostly from Siberia, followed. At the same time about 140,000 people have left, mostly Ukrainians and Tartars. Russian then invaded eastern Ukraine this year, seeking once again to reassert Russian control over the Donbas region, which harbors Russian separatist movements.
