With the new Secretary of Defense and former CIA Director sounding the same party line about staying the course (with more troops) perhaps the perspective of history will help us evaluate the validity of his dire predictions of falling dominos and calamity in the Middle East.
Those of you familiar with the writings of Richard Hofstadter may recognize the title of this post as derived from his essay about American imperial expansion at the time of the Spanish War, "Cuba, the Philippines and Manifest Destiny". In that essay Hofstadter posits that economic imperialism could not be the sole explanation for the annexation of the Philippines at the close of hostilities with Spain in 1898. The Philippines were not a wildly profitable colony and within a generation of their occupation American political leaders--even that icon of American imperialism Theodore Roosevelt-- were calling for the islands' independence. The compelling parallels of zeitgeist warrant serious consideration by our nation's political leaders as they ponder an escape from the foreign policy morass of Iraq.
Hofstadter considered the momentous and unprecedented decision to acquire an overseas possession as the nation's bipolar reaction to a "psychic crisis". Certainly the newspapers, especially the yellow press of the time, did much to whip up jingoism among the public, but something in their collective psyche made them susceptible to war propaganda. The crisis was the acute economic depression of 1893. For the first time in American history an economic event had help create a mass movement large enough to capture one of the major parties. Populism represented the possibility, or threat depending on one's status, of fundamental social change. It was a crusade for the soul of America carried forward with religious zeal. The Populist & Free Silver movement's defeat at the polls after a disruptive campaign created a significant amount of frustration among the disadvantaged. Huge business trusts were eclipsing the scope of individual economic opportunity. Organized labor was locked in a violent struggle with capitalists to win recognition. The closing of the frontier, expressed by Jackson Turner, was another powerful symbol of diminishing expectations. The nation was clearly at a watershed in history and the future was viewed as problematic.
Public reaction to the crisis expressed itself in two opposite moods. One was social empathy expressed in humanitarian protest and social reform; the other was aggressive self-assertion expressed in national power and expansion. The events of the nineties had brought frustration and anxiety to civic minded Americans. The need to be reassured of the nation's strength existed alongside the capacity for sympathy. Therefore, the war against Spain could be viewed by the public simultaneously as a democratic struggle to save Cuba from the colonial oppression of Spain, and the righteous assertion of American power abroad in a world being divided up by predatory European powers. This was manifest destiny applied on a global, not just a continental or even hemispheric, extent.
There was an elite circle of politicians and editors that saw the economic and military potential of a colony in the Orient. Their motivation to annex the Philippines is properly described as imperialist. They were inspired by the naval theories of Alfred Mahan and the practical example of Anglo-Saxon hegemony. At the center of that circle was the extremely manly Teddy Roosevelt. He considered the war against Spain an opportunity to test the metal of American youth while building a proper army and navy befitting an emerging world power. The anti-imperialists were disorganized in comparison. They did not control a major party as did the Republican expansionists. They were politically diverse, elderly, and led by the once defeated William Jennings Bryan whose compromising approach in the face of the public's support for the war undermined anti-imperialist efforts.
America's first steps into the Philippines were presented as defensive. It was assumed that Spanish ships in the Pacific could attack the U.S. west coast. Commodore Dewey was sent to engage them. His ships destroyed the decrepit Spanish Eastern Fleet at anchor in Manila Bay without loosing a man. The spectacular victory was seen as Providential. Understandably, it then gave impetus to the desire to protect the heroic US squadron by occupying Manila with troops. They were dispatched in July, 1898. The capture of Manila was carried out with the cooperation of the Spanish and to the exclusion of indigenous freedom fighters led by Aguinaldo. The protocol ending hostilities called for the occupation of the city pending a final peace settlement.
The America public and Congress were thus presented with a fait accompli by war supporters. To speak against continuing the occupation would be deemed unpatriotic. They argued to leave the Philippines precipitously would expose it to being overrun by other powers and possibly start a war over their possession. The U.S., having defeated the dictatorial colonial power, had a moral obligation to Filipinos who were considered congenitally incapable of self government. England was encouraging American occupation as opposed to one of its European rivals taking control of the strategic archipelago. An all-or-none policy was suggested by the dynamics of the situation. An equivocal President McKinley finally decided on a long term annexation of the entire chain after five months. The joke ran, "How is McKinley's mind like a bed? You have to make it up for him to use it." When it became clear to Filipino patriots after December, 1898 that American intentions did not include returning the islands that American forces were ordered to fully occupy, a fierce and bitter insurgency erupted. The insurgency lasted until 1903 by which time its leaders were either captured or killed. Amazingly, in the process of subduing resistance in the islands using unorthodox methods referred to as 'Injun fighting', U.S. troops (mostly state militia volunteers) resorted to the waterboard torture technique to extract information from prisoners. The "benevolent assimilation" of the Philippines cost a quarter million Filipinos their lives mostly due to malnutrition and disease.
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 caused a psychic crisis in America. A successful attack against the U.S. mainland had not occurred since 1812. The fact that the attack was made covertly by a small group of individuals instead of a uniformed foreign army heightened the trauma. The spectacular toppling of the twin Trade Towers profoundly shattered Americans' sense of personal safety and their confidence in government's ability to protect them. Americans' faith in the validity of their democracy was shakened by the disputed Presidential election of 2000. A popular notion of moral decay seemed confirmed when the previous President was impeached and nearly removed from office for lying about an extra-marital sexual encounter. Many middle class Americans had experienced a deterioration in their economic security causing them grave doubts about their status in the new century. The events of the decade leading to the millennium had brought frustration and anxiety to America's body politic.
This modern psychic crisis made the public particularly susceptible to a sophisticated propaganda campaign urging a foreign war. The war would satisfy a strong desire for retaliation and would promise to regain America's righteous role in the world. America would resume its perceived new manifest destiny of destroying tyranny everywhere and leading the world to universal democracy. The administration's slogans would be tinged with religiosity and fundamental certitude. An elite circle of influential policy experts and journalists adhering to a radical school of political philosophy known as neoconservatism would aid the calculated effort to convince a supine Congress to authorize an invasion. Where there were no objective facts to support the claims of imminent danger, war supporters would resort to using unreliable reports and discredited claims. In short, the justifications for war were fraudulent.
After a brief and remarkably successful military campaign defeating a dictatorial regime that was no real threat to American security, the public and Congress is presented with another fait accompli. We face a determined resistance whose will to fight has been stiffened by extreme U.S. methods and egregious strategic errors. We are told by the Administration that to leave Iraq now is to admit defeat, endanger our army and invite regional chaos. They claim we have a moral obligation to Iraqis who are incapable of providing for their own security. They admonish that only victory by force of arms is an acceptable outcome for a world power whose prestige and credibility hang in the balance.
Their arguments for "staying the course" are distressingly identical to those used by American imperialists of a century ago. However, there is one essential difference in Realpolitik between the Philippines of 1898 and Iraq of 2003. The potential protectorate of Iraq has oil, making it a much more valuable prize for those powerful business interests who wish to profit from a new colony in the midst of the oil zone.
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